Operating

Shimataro: Two Rural Airbnb Homes, ¥10M+ in Six Years, Three of Them Stuck at ¥1M a Year

Shimataro, who runs two rural vacation-rental homes alone, disclosed cumulative revenue above ¥10 million over six years. The breakdown: roughly ¥1 million a year for the first three years (about ¥3 million total), then double the prior year in year four and triple again in year five. During the flat three years he was cleaning thoroughly, answering every message and pricing against the neighbors.

Shimataro: Two Rural Airbnb Homes, ¥10M+ in Six Years, Three of Them Stuck at ¥1M a Year
Reader

A rural vacation rental where the cleaning, replies and pricing are all done properly, and revenue still won't move. What changed when it finally started growing?

In this record, the thing that changed wasn’t the house.

What you'll learn
  • How six years topped ¥10 million, with only about ¥3 million in the first three
  • Why the year-four turning point was deciding who the inn was for, not new equipment
  • How the description, the photos and leaving out the TV moved the listing to a different shelf
  • Our reading of the ranking loop and why complaints dropped
  • Why "around ¥1 million a year" is the only hard yearly figure

Cumulative revenue above ¥10 million in six years.

That’s the figure Shimataro, who runs two rural vacation-rental homes by himself, published on note in July 2025.

Divided across 72 months, it averages about ¥140,000 a month.

The ¥10 million milestone isn’t what makes the record useful, though.

Shimataro opens the breakdown first: “Annual revenue was around ¥1 million. It took three years to finally stack up ¥3 million.”

Less than 30% of the six-year total accumulated in the first half.

The line bent in year four. It doubled against the prior year, then tripled the year after that.

Public records of Japanese vacation rentals tend to lead with how fast the ramp was: occupancy percentages in month one, initial capital recovered inside the first year.

This article does the opposite. The flat three years get more space than the growth.

His hands were never idle during those years, either. Thorough cleaning every turnover, careful message replies, a response to every review. Pricing set in balance with nearby listings.

The result was ¥1 million a year.

Six years as a line graph, bending in year four

Laid out in sequence, exactly as disclosed:

PeriodRevenue
Years 1-3About ¥1 million a year (roughly ¥3 million over three years)
Year 42x the prior year
Year 53x again
Through year 6Cumulative ¥10 million+

The setup and the constraints barely moved across those six years.

ItemDetail
Properties2 (detached houses in the countryside)
OperationHimself, alone
Primary channelAirbnb
LocationNeither a resort area nor near a station
Rating100+ reviews, 4.8 average
DisclosureJuly 2025 (free note post)

No additional units, no additional staff, no change in location.

Revenue was the only thing that grew.

What changed was the addressee, not the house

The turning point he names for year four is neither capital investment nor a new acquisition.

“Deciding who the inn was for. That was all it took,” he writes.

The addressee he settled on: someone who wants quiet time with nobody intruding on it. Every component of the listing was rebuilt to match that single choice.

  1. Photos

    Swapped for brighter, softer ones.

  2. Description

    Deliberately seeded with the phrase "you can spend your time quietly."

  3. Equipment

    A decision to leave the television out.

  4. Check-in instructions

    Rewritten in gentler wording that leaves room to breathe.

  5. Review replies

    Picking up the same thread and reinforcing it.

The old description had read: there’s a bed, Wi-Fi works, free parking is available.

He looks back on it himself as “not wrong, but… it doesn’t reach the emotions.”

The rewritten version: “For those who want to spend quiet time with nobody intruding. On a small hill, a still night is waiting.”

From a description of equipment to a description of time.

That reads like a lesson in prose quality, but our editorial read is more mechanical than that.

On a shelf where a rural detached house is listed as “a place with a bed, Wi-Fi and parking,” the only axes of comparison left are price and distance from a station. A countryside property has little room to win on either.

The moment the addressee narrowed, this listing moved to a different shelf: the one for people buying quiet.

The shelf changed. The house didn’t get better.

The sequence ran through ranking, not price

What worked
  • Higher occupancy
  • More bookings at an unchanged price
  • Search ranking on the booking platform rising on its own
  • Complaints dropping sharply
  • Repeat guests increasing

Those are the outcomes he reports.

Of that list, the structurally heavy item is the ranking.

In a brokered marketplace like Airbnb, a loop turns: a booking arrives, the rating rises, the listing surfaces higher, more bookings arrive.

Which also means that before a listing enters the loop, nothing it does moves the numbers.

Being pinned at ¥1 million for years one through three wasn’t a shortfall of effort. The listing hadn’t reached the entrance to the loop.

The current 100-plus reviews at a 4.8 average are what the loop looks like after it has finished turning.

He didn’t fix the house. He fixed who it was addressed to, and the revenue line bent.

Editors

From here this is our inference. The sharp drop in complaints is a byproduct of the same mechanism. An inn that states its addressee plainly loses the guests who aren't looking for quiet at the booking stage, before they ever arrive.

Leaving the television out looks like removing an amenity. In practice, it must have worked as advance screening of the guest mix.

Fewer dissatisfied guests means higher ratings, and higher ratings means better placement.

One decision pushed several metrics the same direction.

What those three years actually were

The part of this record we want to keep intact is his own diagnosis of the flat years.

“During that period I wasn’t an operator. I was just a site worker.”

He then lists the questions he hadn’t been asking.

“Who is this inn for? What do I want to sell as its appeal?… I had never once put those questions to myself.”

What didn't work
  • Thorough cleaning every turnover, careful message replies, a response to every review
  • Pricing set in balance with nearby listings
  • He kept all of it up, and revenue in years one through three stayed around ¥1 million a year

Cleaning, replying and price adjustment all finish the same day you do them.

Deciding who the place is for changes nothing on the day you do it.

The better the daily operation runs, the easier it is to push the second kind of work back.

Those three years at ¥1 million read more accurately as a record of three years filled entirely with work that closes out, rather than a record of slacking.

The only hard yearly figure is “around ¥1 million”

About the numbers

The only confirmed single-year figure is the "around ¥1 million," and both the year-four doubling and the year-five tripling are relative values. The ¥10 million cumulative total is stated as a floor, and no year-by-year amounts are published. Current monthly revenue therefore can't be derived from this article, and the ¥140,000 in our frontmatter is only the six-year total divided across 72 months. The real distribution leans toward the back half.

The nature of the source deserves a note as well.

The post is free to read, and it closes by pointing to his own paid guide. Publishing numbers as a way to build an entrance is common enough. We use only the figures that appear in the free portion.

Two properties, one operator and a rural setting also don’t transfer cleanly to other scales.

At two units, one person can hold the addressee consistent. Past a certain number of units, holding it consistent becomes a question of operational design.

Three months, 17 months, and six years

There are other records with numbers from rural lodging businesses.

A renovated-farmhouse rental that published its Airbnb analytics three months after opening records the mechanics of the launch phase.

Three regional properties disclosing ¥3.45 million of upfront capital and a 17-month payback records the recovery side.

For a place-rental business that didn’t work out, there’s two rental-space locations running a ¥2.2 million loss across 29 months.

Three months, 17 months, and six years.

The same business of renting out space looks entirely different depending on which time horizon you read it over.

If this one impressed you

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