Eye Love: The Goal Was $1,000 a Month. It Sold for 7 Figures at $400,000 a Month
Eye Love, a dry-eye care brand started in 2015 by two optometrists, was aiming for $1,000 a month in side income. At its 2021 sale it was doing $400,000 a month and $4.2M a year. The deal was 7 figures, and the condition at the center of it was not the price but staying on as salaried employees for 18 months.
If 80% of a product brand's sales run through Amazon, can it still sell to a serious buyer for real money?
For this couple, it did. And they stayed on after the sale.
Let’s walk to that exit in the order the numbers came.
- A table of how a $1,000-a-month side project reached $4.2M a year and a 7-figure sale
- How a competitor's jump from $30 to $300 created the flagship product
- Two crises along the way: a trademark demand and a shipment stuck in customs
- A sale designed around where the founders would stand afterward, before the price
- Our read on how the buyer viewed 80% Amazon concentration
The goal, when they started, was $1,000 a month.
Enough side income to cover travel for one annual trip providing free eye care in places like Ecuador and Peru.
Optometrists Jenna Zigler and Travis Zigler launched the dry-eye care brand Eye Love in 2015, while running their own clinics in South Carolina.
Six years later, it reached $400,000 in monthly revenue and sold for 7 figures.
The account below follows the record from They Got Acquired’s interview with both founders.
Annual revenue at the time of sale is disclosed as $4.2M.
The first thing that stands out about the exit isn’t the price.
A business with 80% to 85% of its revenue riding on Amazon FBA was bought by a healthcare-focused private equity firm. And both founders stayed on as salaried employees for 18 months afterward.
The view that platform concentration repels buyers doesn’t explain this outcome on its own.
From travel money to $4.2M a year
The figures confirmable from the interview:
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Founded | 2015 (both founders optometrists, each running an eye care clinic) |
| Original goal | $1,000/month in side income, to fund an annual free-care mission |
| Outside money | $20,000 from Jenna’s parents. Otherwise self-funded |
| Annual revenue | $4.2M (at sale) |
| Monthly revenue | $400,000 (at sale) |
| Amazon FBA share | 80-85% of the business |
| Email subscribers | 140,000 |
| Monthly pageviews | 200,000 |
| Team | 2 founders plus 3 full-time employees |
| Sale | 2021, to Acumen Health Holdings (now Roundtable Healthcare Partners), 7 figures |
| Consideration | Cash up front plus equity in the parent, plus 18 months of salaried employment |
| Full exit | December 2022 |
The first product was polarized sunglasses.
After the initial shipment of 100 pairs arrived, they discovered they had to hand-assemble them.
The first sale went to a family member. Within five days, every pair was gone.
Amazon advertising drove it.
A competitor’s price increase created the flagship product
The turning point came from another company’s pricing, not from their own product roadmap.
Avenova, a common eyelid wash for dry eye, jumped from $30 to $300.
Their practices saw a great deal of dry eye, so much so that they already ran a Facebook group called the Dry Eye Syndrome Support Community.
Demand was right in front of them.
- A competitor raises its price
Avenova goes from $30 to $300.
- They make their own
They manufacture a hypochlorous acid eyelid wash and sell it at an accessible price.
- The line widens
That became Heyedrate, and the line grew into eyelid wipes and eye compresses.
The sequence here is one you rarely see in Amazon product cases.
They didn’t hunt for a product and land on a market. They already held the position of the person patients bring problems to, and the community where those patients gathered.
Ideas for new products were harvested from that group, the article notes.
Our read is that the core asset of this business was never the Amazon account. It was the 140,000-subscriber email list and the patient community.
Amazon was a powerful place to sell. But what to make was decided on the other side.
A cease-and-desist from a billion-dollar company, and a shipment stuck in customs
The record isn’t limited to the smooth stretches.
One challenge was the trademark.
Shire, a billion-dollar pharmaceutical company later acquired by Takeda, used the phrase “Eye Love” in a television campaign featuring Jennifer Aniston and sent the couple a demand to stop using it.
After several months of back and forth, the Ziglers proved prior use, and Shire offered to settle.
The other was cash.
An entire shipment of product sat in customs for months, temporarily draining the company’s cash.
Jenna told the interviewer that rather than giving in and thinking the company would never recover, they put their heads down and went to work, took the loan they needed to continue, and never stopped providing good content to their community.
None of that shows up in the $4.2M revenue figure. Yet this is a business that borrowed money along the way.
What they decided before the price
They weren’t shopping the company.
After hiring three full-time employees, they were approached by Acumen Health Holdings.
It wasn’t the first acquisition proposal. Several companies had reached out before.
What settled it was preparation. In Jenna’s words:
“Know what you want before you sell. We knew our number, and we knew that we wanted to be a part of the business post-sale. If anyone approached us, and many did, we were able to say” exactly that.
Roundtable accepted the terms.
The 7-figure consideration was cash up front plus equity in the parent company. To support the transition, the buyer kept both founders on as salaried employees for 18 months.
The deal also arranged for affiliate earnings on Eye Love products to be donated monthly to the couple’s nonprofit, the Eye Believe Foundation.
The first thing they fixed wasn’t the price. It was where they’d be standing after the sale.
How did the buyer look at 80% Amazon?
Speculation from here. Our reading is that the concentration of more than 80% of revenue on Amazon wasn't treated as a deduction in this deal.
The buyer was a healthcare PE firm assembling a portfolio.
It purchased a product line already profitable on Amazon, along with the two optometrists capable of deciding what to make, including 18 months of their time.
The shape of it suggests the buyer weighed transferable products and handover certainty above standalone channel risk.
Which makes the founders’ condition advantageous for the buyer as well.
Eighteen months works not only as the sellers’ preference but as the time required to move specialist knowledge across.
The interview presents the condition as what the founders wanted. It reads more naturally as a term where both sides’ interests lined up.
“Seven figures” with nothing inside, recorded from the sellers’ side only
The sale price is disclosed only as 7 figures, with neither the exact amount nor the multiple published, so there's no way to judge what the $4.2M in revenue fetched. The $400,000 monthly figure is the level at the time of sale and differs from the roughly $350,000 implied by dividing annual revenue by twelve. The seasonal range is unknown. Margins and ad spend aren't disclosed.
The source is a single interview with the founders, with no account from the buyer.
The trademark dispute is recorded only from their side, too.
The reading that the buyer didn’t mark down the 80% Amazon share is drawn from that one-sided record as well.
Ordered by annual revenue, Amazon-centered e-commerce exits form a ladder.
This case at $4.2M a year, Puzzle Ready at $3M a year with 99% on Amazon FBA, Happy Puppin, which went from $1M a year to a mid-7-figure sale, and Hipstik at $112K a year sold for $200K.
For a married pair reaching 7 figures with no employees, FeedbackPanda is the counterpart.
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