A Side-Business Smartphone Lens Filter Brand Sold in Two Months After Listing, Prompted by a Job Change. The Conditions for a "Perfect-Score Sale"
THE emo, a smartphone camera lens filter brand Renpei Taniguchi launched as a side business in 2020, grew by winning fans through crowdfunding and social media. Facing a job-change deadline, he listed on multiple platforms, met with 4 companies, and transferred the business to Mediair Inc. in under two months. His own verdict: "a perfect score."
A side business’s exit comes down to three options: shut it down, leave it idle, or transfer it. Cases where the founder chose transfer and could sum it up as “a perfect score” are rare. The transfer of smartphone lens filter brand “THE emo” (under two months from listing to close, with high satisfaction on both the seller’s and buyer’s sides) is close to an ideal-form record of the side-business exit playbook. Let’s trace it back to the launch and break down why it was possible.
From the “constraints” of reselling to an original brand
Renpei Taniguchi started out as a sole proprietor in January 2019, launching a side business while remaining a company employee. His motivation, in his own words: “It felt like a waste to use the skills I’d built in my day job only inside the company. I wanted to test how much I could earn and what I could do on my own.” His first venture was reselling overseas electronics and smartphone chargers as a distributor. But as he puts it, “distributor agreements come with many constraints on sales volumes and methods, and the lack of freedom became a source of stress”. He hit the limits of selling other people’s products and decided to launch an original brand.
The idea for “THE emo” came from a conversation with a photographer friend. With DSLR cameras, changing filters and lenses to change your expression is taken for granted, bring that idea to smartphones, and the target becomes the entire market for the world’s most-used camera: the smartphone camera. He established the brand in 2020, generated buzz through crowdfunding, and built a fanbase through social media. As the business grew he incorporated (Story&Eureka Inc.) and thoroughly outsourced operations. The decision criterion Taniguchi cites again and again is: “Always put the buyer’s perspective first. As a buyer myself, does this product excite me?”
Timeline from launch to transfer
| Period | Event |
|---|---|
| January 2019 | Became a sole proprietor while staying employed. Started with distributor sales of overseas electronics and smartphone chargers |
| 2020 | Cut ties with the “constraints” of distributorship and founded original brand “THE emo.” Built initial momentum via crowdfunding |
| Growth phase | Converted followers into fans via social media; incorporated; pushed efficiency through outsourcing |
| October 2025 | With a job change approaching, listed on multiple M&A platforms including Batonz |
| After listing | Approaches from multiple companies → web meetings with 4 companies |
| ~2 months later | Transfer closed with Mediair Inc. Price undisclosed (“agreed on terms befitting the scale of the business”) |
The buyer, Mediair Inc., is a company based in Tokyo and Osaka that provides e-commerce consulting and operations. Its motive for the acquisition was expanding its own D2C business. Taniguchi says he sensed at the very first meeting that “this is probably who I’ll be handing it to,” and the sincere, cooperative attitude of the company’s representative, Mr. Futaki, became the final deciding factor.
Why it sold in two months
There were two reasons for selling: the business had grown to a scale a side gig could no longer handle, and there was the deadline of a job change. Taniguchi was clear-eyed about it, “There isn’t enough time to make it bigger. Better to have someone with more capacity grow the brand I’ve raised”, and narrowed his buyer-selection criteria to two axes: “speed” and “the ability to understand and develop the brand.” Completing the handover before his new job’s start date was a hard requirement.
What underpinned the fast close was, in his own words, a simple business model that avoided person-dependency. Because outsourcing had been thorough, the product, sourcing, and sales channels were well organized, making the handover easy to explain. To borrow his phrasing: “I had things arranged so the handover itself only required conveying the ‘top layer’ (an overview of contacts with outsourcing partners and business counterparts.” Even without consciously preparing to sell, a fully outsourced business is always in a “ready to hand over” state) that is the technical core of this case.
What was happening inside the negotiation
Even a seemingly smooth process had its dilemmas. What worried Taniguchi most was the scope of information disclosure and the counterparty’s trustworthiness. Before closing, how much confidential information should you show? How far can you trust the other side? His response was to be honest about what he could not disclose, telling them “I can’t disclose this at this stage,” with reasons. Mediair understood and met him halfway, and Batonz’s materials and staff support kept the process moving. That trust was built not through negotiation tactics but through “honestly articulating the disclosure line” is a practical reference point for any individual selling a business for the first time.
Our take
A “sale with a deadline” looks disadvantageous, but it tightens decision-making. The hard deadline of a job start date drove the high-speed process of 4 meetings and a 2-month close. The caution: a deadline on its own tilts the table toward the buyer. It did not collapse the price here because listing on multiple platforms had created a comparison environment among 4 companies. Rather than drifting while waiting for a higher offer, combining a hard deadline with timing strategy, like Fin vs Fin’s “avoid Q4”, often produces the better deal.
A D2C brand’s transferability is decided by whether the founder is in the picture. THE emo’s protagonists were the product and the brand’s worldview. It did not depend on the founder’s personal influencer status. In effect, he preempted the lesson of Lively Table (person-dependency doesn’t get priced) without intending to.
His own summary: “By not getting overly attached and treating M&A as one option among others, you can seize bigger opportunities.” Taniguchi will focus on his day job for now, saying, “If something I want to do comes along in the future, I won’t use having a day job as an excuse, I’ll take on the new challenge.” This case concretely demonstrates the three exits available to a side business: closure, idling, or transfer.
What to discount
The transfer price is undisclosed, and “a perfect score” is the seller’s self-assessment. The fairness of the price level cannot be externally verified. The fans accumulated through crowdfunding and social media are a brand asset, but whether that enthusiasm survives a founder handover depends on the buyer’s operational skill, as of this article, nothing more is known than that “further growth initiatives are underway.” That the product was a single, easily explained category, lens filters, also contributed to the closing speed. There is no guarantee a D2C brand with complex SKUs and distribution would sell as fast.
Conditions for reproducing this
What generalizes is the operational design. Outsourcing and organized workflows raise a side business’s sustainability regardless of any intent to sell, and as a byproduct create a state of being “ready to hand over at any time.” Creating a comparison environment by listing on multiple platforms simultaneously, and honestly stating what cannot be disclosed with reasons, also apply at any scale. On the other hand, the 2-month close rested on case-specific conditions, “an easily explained single-product brand” and “encountering a buyer with e-commerce know-how”, and setting a deadline does not by itself make anyone sell fast. The deadline strategy is a weapon available only to businesses whose systematization is already done.
Related reading
Sources
- Founder バトンズ成約事例「Story&Eureka株式会社」
Similar cases

Apparel EC Business (Fully Outsourced) Sells for ¥2,160,000 (About 6.3 Months of Monthly Revenue)
E-commerce
Amazon Seller Account (10 Years of Operation) Sells for ¥1,380,000
E-commerce
Happy Puppin: 60,000 Fans Built on Dog Memes — a Robot Piggy Bank Took It From $1M/Year to a Mid-7-Figure Sale in 3 Years
E-commerce
Hipstik: A 1% Return Rate vs. a 40% Industry Average — Why a $112K/Year Hosiery D2C Sold for $200K
E-commerceMost read
- 1
Peak Monthly Sales of ¥1 Million on minne. A Former Designer Turned Handmade Artist Explains the Craft of "Photos That Sell"
34 recent visits - 2
Six AI videos, ¥153,030 in the first month — one video with 4.22 million views drove two-thirds of TikTok monetization revenue
21 recent visits - 3
From 30 yen in revenue to 8 years later: how running 3 apps in parallel got an indie developer to 200,000 yen a month
19 recent visits - 4
Side-Business Blog "Tsuzuki Blog": From ¥42,000 to ¥1 Million a Month in One Year. Breaking Down the Published Monthly Data
15 recent visits - 5
Shichinatsu: A Salaried Designer's BOOTH Asset Shop Sells ¥1.08M in Six Months — Every Monthly Figure From ¥100K to ¥250K, Disclosed
13 recent visits
Latest articles
- 2026-09-26
Genji Reincarnation: 32 copies in month one, and a payout of zero
- 2026-09-25
Pirsch Analytics: One-Employee GA Alternative Grows MRR From $11,000 to $14,300, Publishing Its Numbers Every Year
- 2026-09-25
Kokou no Tabibito: A Multi-Topic Blog Hitting 500K Monthly PV and ¥300,000/Month in About a Year
- 2026-09-24
Fomo: a $10,000 MRR widget bought on seller financing, a best month of $154,000, and a seven-figure sale to Relay Commerce six years later
- 2026-09-23
Okashi Kaigyo Lab: a 13-tsubo cake shop booked ¥27,073,172 in year three and published every monthly sales figure to the yen