Kainga: $300,000 in Total Sales, and What Reached the Developer Was "Very Little"
Erik Rempen, the solo developer of Kainga: Seeds of Civilization, self-reported $300,000 in total sales on his debut game and said that after the publisher recouped its investment and expenses were settled, "the amount that ultimately remained as profit was very little." His second game passed $100,000 within a month of release, again mostly not his to keep, though on better contract terms.
If a game one person made sold $300,000, surely a good chunk of that stayed with him?
His own answer was “very little.”
Let’s read what happened between the sales and the take-home through the shape of the contract.
- The revenue spread from a thread where about 50 developers posted figures, and where $300,000 sits
- The three stages of the publisher contract, and where the money went
- Why game two changed the contract terms rather than the sales
- The limit: neither the advance nor the share rate is public
Total sales on the debut game: $300,000.
And still, “the amount that ultimately remained as profit was very little.”
Erik Rempen, who developed Kainga: Seeds of Civilization alone and posts as KaingaDev, wrote that in an r/gamedev thread. AUTOMATON reported the remarks in detail on May 27, 2026.
About 50 developers posted revenue figures for their own games in the same thread.
In AUTOMATON’s tally, 9 reported under $100, 10 between $100 and $1,000, 17 between $1,000 and $10,000 (the thickest band), and 7 between $10,000 and $100,000. Only 4 cleared $100,000.
A figure of $300,000 lands a few places from the top of that distribution.
So this is a record of a developer on the upper side of indie game revenue writing that almost nothing reached him anyway.
Reading success off the revenue line collapses in one sentence.
A few places from the top
Here’s the thread’s distribution as AUTOMATON organized it.
| Revenue band | Developers reporting |
|---|---|
| Under $100 | 9 |
| $100 to $1,000 | 10 |
| $1,000 to $10,000 | 17 |
| $10,000 to $100,000 | 7 |
| $100,000 and up | 4 |
The highest figure in the thread was about $970,000, from a user posting as sn0bil. Rempen’s $300,000 sits on the step below.
The product-side numbers are confirmable on the Steam store page.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Title | Kainga: Seeds of Civilization |
| Developer / Publisher | Erik Rempen (individual) / Silk Softworks |
| Release | December 6, 2022 |
| Price | ¥2,050 (Steam Japan listing) |
| Reception | 641 reviews, 74% positive |
| Format | Roguelite village-builder, 30-90 minutes per run |
| Second game | Over $100,000 in total sales about a month after release (as of May 2026) |
What sits between $300,000 and “very little”?
He names where the money went.
The clause reads: after the publisher’s recoupment of its investment and the settling of various expenses. According to AUTOMATON, Rempen was the only developer in the thread who disclosed the contents of a publisher contract.
The structure has three stages.
- During development
The publisher provides an advance and funding.
- After release, until recoupment
The developer's ability to take profit is restricted until the publisher has recovered its investment.
- After recoupment
The developer still doesn't receive the full revenue, taking a share instead.
That third stage is the one readers skip.
If you assume revenue flows straight to the developer after recoupment, there’s no way to explain how $300,000 leaves very little behind.
Under a contract where sharing continues after recovery, a fixed portion of every additional sale keeps going to the publisher.
Gross revenue and developer take-home never become proportional.
AUTOMATON also notes that publisher deals bring “various advantages, including financial support during development and promotional reach.”
What arrives is more than money. Exposure volume is hard for a solo developer to arrange alone.
The 641 Steam reviews at 74% positive describe a game that was no breakout hit. Still, it reached a real number of hands. A 30-to-90-minute roguelite run found the players it suits.
How much of that reach came from promotion can’t be separated out. At the very least, the $300,000 required both the game and the exposure.
Here’s our judgment. This contract was no bad trade.
An advance plus funding during development is a mechanism for separating several years of work from sales risk. Rempen describes it himself as having built a setup that didn’t depend on post-launch revenue alone.
The $300,000 success had been traded for the years of living expenses while it was being built.
The variable on game two was the contract, not the sales
Rempen shipped his second game as a full-time solo developer.
As of AUTOMATON’s article, about a month after release, total sales had passed $100,000. That’s top-four-of-the-thread territory inside one month. And he writes that most of this one will also be out of his hands.
He adds that the contract terms came out better than on the previous game.
That single line is the most operationally useful part of the case, in our view.
What changed on game two was neither the genre nor the engine nor the price. It was the split.
From here this is our inference. The sequence shows that game one's revenue became the bargaining chip. A developer with no track record has little choice but to accept unfavorable terms to secure an advance, and a $300,000 track record moves the next set of terms. The very fact that almost nothing remained from game one was buying the terms on game two.
One contract in view, with neither the advance nor the share rate disclosed
Plenty of items in this case can’t be confirmed.
The size of the advance, the revenue share, the time to recoupment, the breakdown of expenses. None of it has been published. "Very little" is a description rather than an amount, and we don't construct estimates.
The figures are self-reported to Reddit with no audit and no third-party verification. We couldn't retrieve the Reddit thread directly either, so the content of the remarks was confirmed through AUTOMATON's quotation. The second game's title couldn't be pinned down from the publisher's Steam catalog, so this article doesn't name it.
The nature of the thread also needs discounting.
Fifty or so people is a gathering of those who chose to write in an amount, and it doesn’t describe the industry’s distribution. AUTOMATON closes the article by pairing the difficulty of turning a profit with “the breadth of an indie development scene that runs on more than business motives.”
This record is one contract, and advances and share rates differ by publisher.
No comparable terms have been published, so whether these were favorable or not can’t be judged from this article.
Rempen also shipped both titles with a publisher attached. That rules out any comparison against what the same game would have left him if self-funded.
The distance between revenue and profit reads clearly here. What determines that distance doesn’t follow from a single case.
Lining up indie game revenue shows the range.
Thirteen games earning ¥700 in total. A first Steam release selling 32 copies in a month, where ¥20,000 of promotion exceeded the revenue. A solo-built VR game whose ¥5,913,887 annual revenue was published alongside the ledger. And $300,000 in total sales. The amounts span four orders of magnitude.
Set against Streets of Rogue, an indie game funded with ¥2.7 million of the developer’s own money and sold for roughly ¥970 million, the subject of this case comes into focus as the split rather than the exit.
The same revenue leaves a different number behind depending on whom you divide it with, and how.
If this one impressed you
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Sources
- Reported AUTOMATON(2026年5月27日公開・全文無料)。Reddit の r/gamedev スレッド「How much did your indie game earn?」に寄せられた約50人の自己申告額の分布と、KaingaDev(Erik Rempen)氏の発言を詳述。デビュー作30万ドル・手残りごく僅か、パブリッシャーの前払い金と投資回収の構造、2作目が1ヶ月で10万ドル超・契約条件は改善という内容
- Founder 元スレッド(r/gamedev)。本人が売上額・手残り・契約条件の改善を自己申告した投稿元。当サイトからは直接取得できなかったため、内容はAUTOMATONの引用で確認した
- Founder Steamストアページ。開発 Erik Rempen(個人)・販売 Silk Softworks、2022年12月6日配信、日本価格2,050円、レビュー641件で74%が好評(「やや好評」)、30〜90分で1周するローグライト系の村作りゲーム