Shopify App Maker Tabarnapp Sells to App Acquirer StayTuned: The Etiquette of "Closing Up Shop" in an App Store
Tabarnapp, which built apps solving Shopify merchants' problems, was sold to StayTuned, a company that buys up Shopify apps. The same standard route as Order Tagger to Shop Circle — a well-worn exit inside the app store.
Tabarnapp stands out among Shopify app sales for how unusually thoroughly the “process of closing up shop” is disclosed. The founder shares when he hired a broker, how many offers came in, how many months it took to close, and even the approximate sale price. A business with $1 million in annual revenue and 80% gross margin — the exact steps, timeline, and dollar amount by which it was turned into cash is a rare record you can trace at face value: the final stage of “build it, grow it, sell it.”
The Path to the Sale
Tabarnapp was a development company founded in Quebec, Canada, in 2016 by Derek Morin and Bogdan Radu, building several apps for Shopify merchants. Its flagship, Automatic Discount, automates the creation of a merchant’s discount campaigns. It reached 1,000 paying customers within four months of launch, and by 2022 the business as a whole had crossed $1 million in annual revenue (about ¥150M at ¥150/$1) with an 80% net margin. Over 60,000 stores had cumulatively downloaded the flagship app, with roughly 2,500 recurring-billing customers paying $10–1,000 a month. It was run entirely bootstrapped, with no outside capital.
Morin has described the motive for selling as fear of platform dependency: “There’s no telling when Shopify might absorb the feature and wipe us out.” The decision was to hand off both the thriving business and that very risk to a buyer while things were going well. In late June 2022 they engaged Array Capital, a Switzerland-based SaaS-specialist broker, and had three offers in hand by August. The sale to StayTuned, which specializes in acquiring and growing Shopify apps, closed in November. Less than half a year passed from engaging the broker to closing. The sale price is undisclosed, but it’s been referenced as being in the mid-seven figures, around $4 million (roughly ¥600M), on the podcast Built to Sell Radio.
Closing Up Shop, by the Numbers
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Founded | 2016 (Derek Morin, Bogdan Radu) |
| Flagship app | Automatic Discount (automates discount creation) |
| Early traction | 1,000 paying customers within 4 months of launch |
| Annual revenue | Over $1M (2022), 80% net margin |
| Customer base | Over 60,000 cumulative store downloads; 2,500 recurring-billing customers ($10–1,000/month) |
| Broker | Array Capital (engaged late June 2022) |
| Offers | 3 by August 2022 |
| Closed | November 2022, to StayTuned |
| Sale price | Undisclosed (referenced at around $4M / ¥600M) |
Against annual revenue of $1 million, roughly $4 million puts the revenue multiple at about 4x. Factoring in the 80% net margin, that’s roughly 5x on a profit basis, a level that’s unexaggerated but entirely reasonable for a small-scale SaaS.
A Market with Multiple Buyers Changes a Seller’s Negotiating Environment
What deserves attention in this deal is not so much “how much it sold for” as “who it sold to, and how.” Three offers landing within two months of engaging a broker is a function of multiple dedicated app buyers having grown up inside the Shopify world. Beyond StayTuned, roll-up companies like Shop Circle, which acquired Order Tagger, are constantly buying inside the same ecosystem. In a market with only one roll-up player, a seller has no choice but to accept the price offered; in a market with multiple repeat buyers, competitive bidding can occur. For an app of the same size, the multiple you land at can differ based purely on this difference in environment.
The buyer’s economics are rational too. Billing for Shopify apps is standardized through the store, so post-acquisition integration costs (migrating billing systems, re-signing customers) come in near zero. That’s why roll-ups end up with a “buy more, get more efficient” structure, which in turn keeps attracting more buyers. The depth of exit options available to a seller is a byproduct of that cycle.
The App Store as a “Pre-Built Founding Environment”
SaaS built inside an app store comes with all three essentials pre-installed from day one: customer acquisition (in-store search and reviews), billing (store payments), and an exit (roll-ups). Infrastructure that would take years to build from scratch is simply “already there.” The early traction of 1,000 paying customers within four months of launch, and penetration into 60,000 stores, aren’t explainable without the store’s distribution network behind them. Set alongside Jexo in the Atlassian ecosystem, the same pattern holds across stores: grow through the store’s distribution, sell to a store-specialist buyer.
Reading This From the Risk Side
The other side of this case is written right into the very reason for the sale. That the founders let go of an 80%-margin, $1M-revenue business because “there’s no telling when Shopify might wipe us out” is a candid testimony to the instability of the app-store economy. The core feature, automated discounting, could become worthless overnight if the platform ever builds it in natively. The roughly 4x multiple should be read as a price that already priced in that survival risk. An independent SaaS at the same profit level could plausibly command a higher multiple.
One more caveat worth flagging: the primary-source sale price is undisclosed, and the roughly $4 million figure comes from a podcast mention rather than a confirmed source. It’s a useful order-of-magnitude guide, but not a confirmed number.
One of the two sellers’ next projects was a book about selling within 24 months
Both founders spent a year assisting StayTuned after the sale before launching ReplyChef.app, a new social-media management support tool. Morin has also started writing a book, titled Happy Ending, on the theme of “selling a business within 24 months.” A founder who has been through one exit turns around to build “with a sale in mind from the start.” Watching three offers line up within two months of hiring a broker feeds straight into the subject of that book.
It is worth recalling the motive for the sale here. The reason for letting go of a business with an 80% net margin was “we don’t know when Shopify will destroy us.” A plan to sell within 24 months is also a plan to hand the risk of having a feature absorbed by the platform to the next owner, every time, within 24 months. Our read is that this is a career rebuilt on the assumption that the app-store economy is unstable. The experience of selling sharpened their caution, not their optimism.
Related Reading
If this one impressed you
Similar cases

Median: The Cobrowsing SaaS Sold for "Just Under 300k" by the Founder's Own Account — But the Real Exit Was Two Perpetual Licenses Signed Before It
SaaS
WooThemes: The Cape Town WordPress Theme Shop Whose $30M+ Exit Was Earned by a Late-Born "Internal Plugin" — WooCommerce
SaaS
Fomo: a $10,000 MRR widget bought on seller financing, a best month of $154,000, and a seven-figure sale to Relay Commerce six years later
SaaS
Jira App Portfolio Jexo Sells to Appfire: Three Years from "Two People → Portfolio → Exit" in the Atlassian Ecosystem
SaaSMost read
- 1
¥4.61 Million a Year, Five Years After Starting to Learn Programming. The Full Three-Year P&L and Playbook of an Indie Education App
42 recent visits - 2
From 30 yen in revenue to 8 years later: how running 3 apps in parallel got an indie developer to 200,000 yen a month
28 recent visits - 3
Payout: A Class-Action App Vibe-Coded in 14 Days Reached $1,003,227 ARR in 9 Months. It Cost About $10 to Build, and a Partner With 10 Million Followers Grew It
27 recent visits - 4
From ¥100 to ¥100,000 a Month in Three Years: The Quiet Compounding of an Ads-Only Tool App
26 recent visits - 5
Marketing Examples: 130,000 Subscribers in Three and a Half Years — a “Distribution” Playbook and a $2,300/Month Sponsor Slot
25 recent visits
Latest articles
- 2026-11-11
Just a Girl and Her Blog: $2,446 to a $51,803 Peak Month, With Ads Only 8% of Income, Over 34 Published Reports
- 2026-11-10
Key Values: A One-Person Job Board Doing ~$80K a Quarter, $25K in Its Best Week, on a Few Hundred Dollars of Monthly Costs
- 2026-11-10
Fat Stacks: $1,117,301 Revenue, $130,659 Expenses in 2021 From Unnamed Niche Sites Running on Display Ads
- 2026-11-10
EOFire: 136 Straight Monthly Income Reports End at $131,587 Revenue, 91% Margin, $27.9M Lifetime
- 2026-11-09
Thankbox: £150 to £12,000 a Month in 11 Months Selling $5.99 Online Group Cards
Sources
- Founder They Got Acquired(個別記事)