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Directify: $85,000 Buyout, MRR Fell 20% in Handover, $50K ARR Seven Months Later

Directify, a no-code directory-site builder, was sold to an individual buyer for $85,000 in February 2026 while doing $2,000 MRR. Keeping his nine-to-five, the buyer brought revenue back from the $1,600 it sank to during handover and reached $50K ARR in seven months. As of the six-month mark, roughly $70,000 of the purchase price was still unrecovered.

Directify: $85,000 Buyout, MRR Fell 20% in Handover, $50K ARR Seven Months Later

An $85,000 SaaS purchase saw its monthly revenue slide from $2,000 to $1,600 in the middle of the handover. The buyer holds a weekday nine-to-five job, and seven months later, on September 13, 2026, the same product reached $50K ARR. Directify, a no-code builder for directory websites, is an unusual case because both the seller and the buyer have published their numbers.

Compared with the median for SaaS cases alone it is under one tenth, so the scale is modest. Line it up against the 40 cases run as a side business, though, and it clears four times that median. For a business operated alongside a job, the figure sits toward the upper end.

Buying a small SaaS is often framed as a surer shortcut than building one from scratch. Customers and revenue arrive with the purchase, so the framing looks obvious. The record starts from the opposite direction. Operator Venelin Kochev wrote that he “acquired it at $2k but during the transition process it dropped to $1.6k” and that “that was a bit tough.” A fifth of the revenue vanished immediately after the purchase. His tally at the six-month mark showed $16,199.20 in cumulative revenue and $14,080.22 in net profit, alongside the note that he was “still around $70k away from breaking even on the acquisition.” Profitable, and yet four fifths of the principal had not come back.

The record from both sides of the deal

Here is the timeline that can be confirmed from the sources.

DateEvent and figures
Around November 2024Serg builds the product in three weeks. First customer four hours after launch, $1,000 in revenue within 48 hours
November 24, 2025$2,000 MRR. Four months from $0 to $1,000, four more from $1,000 to $2,000
February 6, 2026Venelin Kochev acquires it for $85,000, announced as the largest deal on TrustMRR
Handover periodRevenue falls to $1,600
March 31, 2026Crosses $20K ARR
April 13, 2026Back to $2,000 MRR
July 10, 2026$30K ARR ($2,500 MRR)
July 31, 2026Passes $3,000 MRR for the first time
August 3, 2026$3,100 MRR. Cumulative revenue $16,199.20, net profit $14,080.22, roughly 2,000 commits
September 7, 2026$4,000 MRR. Thirty-five days from $3,000, which he called his “fastest $1k” for the product
September 13, 2026Reaches $50K ARR
As of September 30, 2026His own profile page lists $4,900 a month

The setup and the pricing look like this.

ItemDetail
BusinessNo-code builder for directory websites
TeamOne person. Employer on weekdays, building at night and on weekends
PricingFree (1 directory, 10 listings), Starter $12, Pro $39, Growth $69, Agency $149, all monthly
Annual billingTwelve months paid upfront at the price of ten
Platform cutNothing taken from listing fees, ads or submission fees the customer collects
Shipping219 updates in the public changelog. “Shipping, weekly” on the page, most recent on the day of access
Other productsConvertHub, a file-conversion site, at $30 a month, among others

What worked was shipping speed, not the purchase price

Our read on the tripling of revenue over seven months does not credit novel features. Shipping frequency did the work. The changelog carries 219 entries, and a new one had landed on the day we looked. The roughly 2,000 commits he cites read as a record of weekly hands-on work. The 2.0 overhaul, which bundled a theme editor, 17 templates and a monetization hub, also falls inside this window.

The stretch from $3,000 to $4,000, closed in 35 days, is the clearest signal. Before it, $2,000 to $2,500 took three months and $2,500 to $3,000 another three weeks. The time required for the same $1,000 increment collapsed in the later phase. The natural reading is that the work right after handover went into filling gaps, while the later stretch is where accumulated improvements started to compound.

From here this is speculation, but most of the drop to $1,600 came from the mechanics of the transfer itself, meaning the payment-account switch and cancellations triggered by a change of owner, rather than from any loss of product value. The evidence is the speed of the recovery, which reached $2,000 again in April 2026, before any large feature additions. The lost fifth was not won back by rebuilding anything.

Kochev explains his own edge this way: “It’s 2026, and everyone can build a directory with AI, but I’m still bullish on no-code tools.” Our reading differs slightly. What carries weight here is less the no-code property than the placement of the price. A ladder that starts at $12 a month, combined with a stated refusal to take any cut of what customers collect, creates a condition that a self-built AI-generated site cannot offer. Recovering the 20% lost in handover mattered more than the $85,000 price tag.

Sixty-one percent never publish a single listing

The archival value of this case lies in the operator publishing his own weak points as numbers. A dataset released in July 2026 covers 4,039 sites built on Directify. Of those, 3,395 are live and they hold 513,929 listings in total. And then: “61% never publish a single listing.”

Follow the figures and the falloff gets steeper. Only 777 sites reached the point of having measurable visitors. Directories hitting 100 listings number 313, and 59 passed 1,000. Businesses that created an account in order to be listed number 3,539, while listing claims stop at 325. Leads delivered come to 11,922. Sites that function as real directories exist, but most of what gets built stalls before launch.

The counts published across the site do not agree with each other either. The homepage claims “8,300+ builders” and “3,800+ directories,” while the about page still reads “2,000+” and “500+.” The blog describes “2,000+.” Since the sources conflict, both sets stay on the page here without being reconciled.

What happened to the seller is on the record too. On September 24, 2026, Serg posted that his new product, Blogr, had passed $1,000 MRR. The person who built something in three weeks and turned it into $85,000 over 15 months is back at the $1,000-a-month mark with his next product. A sale closes a chapter. It does not carry the accumulation forward.

Conditions and limits

Three conditions can be read out of this.

  • A purchase price around 42 times monthly revenue holds up only when the buyer can secure enough discretionary hours to keep shipping every week.
  • Accepting a 20% drop at handover is workable only when the payback period is being measured in years.
  • Leaving a free plan wide open works only when pricing already accounts for 60% of users never publishing a single listing.

The limits come in three parts. On the nature of the data, what arrfounder carries is a third party’s record of self-reported figures the founder posted on X, with no verification against payment data. The $4,900 monthly figure on the profile page is self-reported as well. On the setup, the assumption that one person with a weekday job can keep up weekly shipping at night and on weekends is a demanding condition on available time. On scale, $4,900 a month places this at about one third of the archive’s median. As the $70,000 still outstanding shows, this case remains mid-recovery on its own purchase price.

The same pattern, ordered by size

There is RecordJoy at $1,000 a month, bought for $10,000 and sold a year later for $20,000, this case at $4,900 a month, a micro-SaaS rollup of four products at $120,000 combined MRR, and Damon Chen’s PDF.ai, a GitHub repository bought for $20,000 and taken to $1.5M ARR. The purchase prices sit in similar territory while the destinations differ by three orders of magnitude.

On the directory subject itself, we also cover AI Directories, which reached $10,000 a month by handling submission work by hand. That business sells the labor; Directify sells the tool. Two sides of the same demand.

Sources

This article summarizes and analyzes the public sources above. Please refer to the primary sources for details.
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